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CONDOMINIUM CLASS ACTIONS
Modern urban development, characterized by high-rise, high-
density living, large and remote corporate and governmental institu-
tions, and mass-produced, mass-consumed goods, has thrust those within
its grasp into common legal and factual situations.' It is, therefore, not
surprising that, in recent years, much attention has been focused on the
concept of the class or representative action, a device which permits
representatives of a group to bring suit to enforce the rights of all.
Although much class litigation has involved other interests, 2 nowhere
is the utilization of the class action device more appropriate than in
the condominium field. Since unit owners not only live in close prox-
imity to each other, but also share an undivided interest in the common
elements of their condominium, an effective group remedy must be
available to insure that their legal rights do not go unprotected.
An action is maintainable in a given case only when the plaintiffs
have standing to sue. Standing requires that the complaining party
have such a personal stake in the outcome of the controversy as to
entitle him to seek relief in court.3 It has been said that standing consti-
tutes an "access barrier" above which the plaintiff must rise in order to
obtain court review of his complaint.4 In a group condominium action,
the first inquiry deals with the type of rights asserted and whether they
are amenable to group remedy. The next concern is whether the class
representative has a sufficient stake in the controversy to pass over the
standing barrier.5
1 18 N.Y. Jun. COUNCIL REP. 217, 221-22 (1952); J. WEINSTEIN, H. KO.N & A. MILLER,
NEw YORK CIVIL PRACTICE $ 1005.01 (1973) [hereinafter cited as WEINSTEIN, KORN &
MILLFR].
2 -", e.g., Korn v. Franchard Corp., 456 F.2d 1206 (2d Cir. 1972) (investors); Cypress
v. Nc', ort News Gen. and Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648 (4th Cir. 1967) (en
ban) (discrimination against black physicians); City-Wide Coalition Against Childhood
Lead Paint Poisoning v. Philadelphia Housing Authority, 356 F. Supp. 123 (E.D. Pa. 1973)
(indigent tenants); Vasquez v. Superior Court, 4 Cal. 3d 800, 484 P.2d 964, 94 Cal. Rptr.
796 (1971) (en banc) (consumers).
-3 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 731-32 (1972); Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968); Baker v. Carr, 369 U.S. 186, 204 (1962).
[W]hen standing is placed in issue in a case, the question is whether the person
whose standing is challenged is a proper party to request an adjudication of a
particular issue ....
Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99-100 (1968).
4 Albert, Standing to Challenge Administrative Action: An Inadequate Surrogate for
Claim of Relief, 83 YALE L.J. 425, 427 (1974).
The issue of standing goes only to the right of the party to obtain review and not to
the question of whether he is entitled to relief. Id. As former Chief Justice Warren has
stated, standing "focuses.on the party seeking to get his complaint before a federal court
and not on the issues he wishes to have adjudicated." Flast v. Cohen, 392 U.S. 83, 99
(1968).




The class action is designed to avoid a multiplicity of suits and the
related possibility of contradictory adjudications of the same legal or
factual issues and reduce expenses to both the state and the litigants.
It also provides economic, psychological and procedural advantages to
the class.6 However, many courts have been reluctant to allow use of the
device because it may deprive an injured party of the right to elect his
remedies,7 bind absent parties to a class judgment," and give malcon-
tents an "instrument of harassment."
Class actions spawned by condominiums have arisen in several
contexts. Controversies amenable to class action include those over
building conversions, defective construction and carrying charges.
Parties bringing class actions must demonstrate that the balance of
conflicting values tilts in favor of allowing their suits to be main-
tained." New York permits class actions to be maintained in either of
two instances: 1) where the question concerns a common or general
interest of many persons or 2) where the potential parties are numerous
and joinder would be impracticable."
ment by Mr. Justice Douglas that "generalizations about standing to sue are largely
worthless as such." Association of Data Processing Organizations v. Camp, 39: U.S. 150, 151
(1970).
6 18 N.Y. JuD. COUNCIL REP. 217, 221 (1952); WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 1,
at 1005.06.
7 Summers v. Wyman, 64 Misc. 2d 67, 71, 314 N.Y.S.2d 430, 434 (Sup. Ct. Nassau
County 1970); 18 N.Y. JuD. COUNCIL REP. 217, 231 (1952); WEINSTEIN, KORN 8- MILLER,
supra note I, at 1005.01. See Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 233, 11
N.E.2d 890, 891 (1937); Bennett v. Strow, 28 Misc. 2d 914, 915, 220 N.Y.S.2d 806, 807-08
(Sup. Ct. Nassau County 1961).
8 18 N.Y. JuD. COUNCIL REP. 217, 221, 227 (1952); WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra
note 1, at 1005.01.
9 Hall v. Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396, 404, 259 N.E.2d 720, 723, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281,
285-86 (1970); see Adler v. Bonner Realty & Constr. Co., 62 Misc. 2d 710, 713, 309 N.Y.S.2d
404, 407 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1970); WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 1, at
1005.11.
10 See In re Cisco v. Lavine, 72 Misc. 2d 1009, 1012-13, 340 N.Y.S.2d 275, 279 (Sup. Ct.
Nassau County), modified, 72 Misc. 2d 1087, 341 N.Y.S.2d 719 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County
1973); WEINSTEIN, Kom & MILLER, supra note 1, at 1005.05.
11 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 1005(a) (McKinney 1963). The word "or" "has been construed
disjunctively thus eliminating the requirement of impracticality of joinder when a
question of common or general interest is involved." 18 N.Y. JUD. COUNCIL REP. 217, 224
(1952). However, the New York Court of Appeals has never considered this question. See
N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 1005, legislative studies at 306 (McKinney 1963). See also CAL. CODE
Civ. P. § 382 (West 1973); Bowles v. Superior Court, 44 Cal. 2d 574, 283 P.2d 704, 712 (1955)
(en banc), wherein the California class action statute was also construed in the disjunctive.
In applying the statute, the New York courts have adopted a conservative approach.
The "tendency . . .is to restrict, rather than enlarge, the scope of class action." Hall v.
Coburn Corp., 26 N.Y.2d 396,402, 259 N.E.2d 720, 722, 311 N.Y.S.2d 281, 284 (1970).
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Under both New York State's and New York City's rent control
regulations, a rent-controlled (statutory) tenant may be evicted from
his apartment by the purchaser of stock in a cooperative if 35 percent
of the tenants in occupancy purchased stock in the cooperative in good
faith and in the absence of fraud, duress, or any discriminatory re-
purchase agreement or inducement.12 New York City's regulations ex-
tend the 35 percent requirement to condominium conversions. 13
Whether a tenant or class of tenants has standing to challenge the con-
version depends upon whether or not their apartments are subject to
rent regulation.14 It is well established law that, because of the threat
of eviction, nonpurchasing statutory tenants have standing to bring a
class action for a declaratory judgment against the validity of the co-
operative plan. 15 Purchasing tenants, however, could not bring a class
action for fraud in the sale even though the fraud may have been com-
mitted pursuant to a common plan. Because of the individual nature
of fraud actions, New York courts have refused to permit representative
actions grounded in fraud or deceit.16
12 N.Y. ST. RENT & EVICTION R. § 55(3)(c)(i) (McKinney 1974); N.Y. CITY RENT &
EVICTION R. § 55(c)(3)(a) (McKinney 1974). In a recent development, New York enacted
legislation granting tenants in occupancy a greater degree of protection. An amendment
to General Business Law § 352-e requires condominium offering plans to include a provi-
sion that 35% of the tenants must consent to purchase under the plan before the plan can
take effect. N.Y. Sass. LAWS [1974], ch. 1021, § 2-a(l)(i) (McKinney). For a more detailed
treatment of conversion requirements, see Note, Tenant Protection in Condominium
Conversions, supra.
13 N.Y. CITY RENT & EVICTION R. § 55(f)(3)(c) (McKinney 1974).
14 Recently enacted legislation requires that 35% of the tenants in occupancy consent
to purchase units pursuant to the conversion plan before the plan can go into effect. See
note 12 supra. Since unit owners are entitled to base their decision to purchase on a
complete and proper plan, they should have standing to challenge the means by which
the 35% were induced to give their consent. However, Whalen v. Lefkowitz, 44 App.
Div. 2d 442, 445, 355 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1st Dep't 1974), apparently precludes the
maintenance of such an action.
15 Gilligan v. Tishman Realty & Constr. Co., 283 App. Div. 157, 126 N.Y.S.2d 813 (1st
Dep't 1953), aff'd, 306 N.Y. 974, 120 N.E.2d 230 (1954) (mem.); Schumann v. 250 Tenants
Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 253, 317 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970); Pensic v. Sulzberger
(Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 164 N.Y.L.J. 11, July 16, 1970, at 2, col. 2. See Judson v. Frankel,
279 App. Div. 372, 110 N.Y.S.2d 156 (1st Dep't 1952) (individual tenant and tenant
"protective committee" held to have standing).
16 Tuvim v. 10 East 30 Corp., 32 N.Y.2d 541, 545, 300 N.E.2d 397, 398, 347 N.Y.S.2d
13, 14-15 (1973); Richards v. Kaskel, 32 N.Y.2d 524, 536 n.6, 300 N.E.2d 388, 393 n.6, 347
N.Y.S.2d 1, 9 n.6 (1973); Society Milion Athena v. National Bank of Greece, 281 N.Y. 282,
22 N.E.2d 374 (1939); Brenner v. Title Guar. & Trust Co., 276 N.Y. 230, 11 N.E.2d 890
(1937); Greeley v. Rockaway Point Development Corp., 15 App. Div. 2d 528, 223 N.Y.S.2d
84 (2d Dep't 1966) (mem.).
In Society Milion, Chief Judge Lehman stated: "Separate wrongs to separate pelsons,
though committed by similar means and even pursuant to a single plan, do not alone
create a common or general interest in those who are wronged." 281 N.Y. at 292, 22
N.E.2d at 377. Each plaintiff must be able to make his own choice of remedies and the
defendants may have defenses available against some plaintiffs that are not available
1170
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Under the New York City Administrative Code, any landlord sub-
ject to the real estate industry stabilization code may not refuse to renew
a lease by virtue of a conversion of a rent-stabilized building unless he
obtains purchase agreements from 35 percent of the tenants. 17 In a
recent case, the New York Court of Appeals held that these rent-
stabilized tenants, who otherwise would be entitled to renewal leases,
have standing to bring a class action for declaratory relief.'8 Nonpur-
chasing tenants, not subject to any form of rent regulation, would not
have standing to maintain any action, class or otherwise.19
Conversions
A valid offering plan must be filed with the Attorney General of
New York before any public offering of an interest in a real estate
investment can be made.20 In Grenader v. Lefkowitz, 2 . a New York
trial court held that nonpurchasing tenants in occupancy, whether
against others. Id. Additionally, the degree of reliance on the misrepresentation may
vary from plaintiff to plaintiff. See Coolidge v. Kaskel (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 150
N.Y.L.J. 14, July 19, 1963, at 5, col. 7, aff'd, 19 App. Div. 2d 947, 245 N.Y.S.2d 350 (Ist Dep't
1963) (mem.), aff'd, 16 N.Y.2d 559, 208 N.E.2d 780, 260 N.Y.S.2d 835 (1965) (mem.).
Of course, purchasing tenants, whether rent-controlled or not, would have standing
to bring individual actions for fraud. See Adler v. Bonner Realty & Constr. Co., 62 Misc. 2d
710, 713-14, 309 N.Y.S.2d 404, 407-08 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County 1970).
17 N.Y.C. ADMIN. CODF § YY51-6.0(c)(9)(a) (McKinney 1974).
18 Richards v. Kaskel, 32 N.Y.2d 524, 300 N.E2d 388, 347 N.Y.S.2d 1 (1973). Chief
Judge Fuld held that there was no bar to a class action:
The plaintiffs and the other tenants on whose behalf they instituted suit would
be ousted from possession were it held that the building was lawfully and
properly' co-operated. . . .The present case undoubtedly involves a question of
common interest affecting the rights of every non-purchasing tenant in the
building.
Id. at 535, 300 N.E.2d at 393, 347 N.Y.S.2d at 8.
19 Cf. Ortega v. Lefkowitz, 66 Misc. 2d 438, 440, 321 N.Y.S.2d 17, 19 (Sup. Ct. N.Y.
County 1971). The plaintiffs' rights are not affected because "at most a change of owner-
ship of the building is involved and tenants are granted no rights by statute or otherwise
to interfere therewith." Id.
No fraud action would lie because the nonpurchasing tenants necessarily did not
purchase an apartment in reliance on the misrepresentations alleged. But see Pensic v.
Sulzberger (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 164 N.Y.L.J. 11, July 16, 1970, at 2, col. 2.
20 N.Y. GEN. Bus. L. § 352(e) (McKinney Supp. 1974).
The technical sufficiency of the offering plan must first be determined by the Attorney
General, with his decision subject to Article 78 review by the courts, pursuant to N.Y.
Civ. PaAc. § 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1968); 1045 Tenants Ass'n v. Attorney General, 73
Misc. 2d 600, 342 N.Y.S.2d 769 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1973); Schumann v. 250 Tenants
Corp., 65 Misc. 2d 253, 317 N.Y.S.2d 500 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970).
However, the requirement that the Attorney General make the initial determination
as to alleged deficiencies in the offering plan extends only to those defects that would not
be actionable but for the filing requirement. Schumann v. 250 Tenants Corp., 65 Misc.
2d 253, 256, 317 N.Y.S.2d 500, 504-05 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1970). Even though the At-
torney General is required by statute to review the prospectus, "th[e] court retains its
inherent jurisdiction in law and equity to deal with allegations of fraud, deceit, mis-
representation and breach of fiduciary obligations, irrespective of the statutory require-
ments." Id. at 257, 317 N.Y.S.2d at 505.
21 71 Misc. 2d 414, 416, 336 N.Y.S.2d 355, 356 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1972).
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subject to rent control or not, have standing to maintain a special pro-
ceeding22 to annul the Attorney General's decision to accept for filing
the offering plan of a proposed cooperative corporation. The court
recognized that, given a severe housing shortage, such a decision has
"far-reaching" consequences and may result in an alteration of the
tenant's quality of life.2 Thus, there was a sufficient common interest
to allow the nonpurchasing parties to demand that an offering plan be
free from defects or illegality.
Unfortunately, the holding in Grenader was impliedly rejected
by the Appellate Division, First Department, in Whalen v. Lefkowitz,2
one of two recent cases stemming from a much publicized condo-
minium conversion controversy. The tenants in the North Quadrant
of the Parkchester development in Bronx County, New York, brought
two class actions in an attempt to block the proposed conversion. In
Whalen, the Appellate Division reversed a lower court order which had
held that a class action could be maintained, in the context of a special
proceeding, on behalf of all the tenants in the buildings subject to
conversion.2 5 All tenants in the North Quadrant, whether subject to
rent controls or not, were given the exclusive right to purchase their
own apartments. The trial court had ruled that all the tenants were
thus entitled to a complete and proper offering plan on which to base
their decision to purchase. If the plan were defective as alleged, a class
action would lie since "all the tenants were injured in the same manner
as they were compelled to make their decision based on a deficient
plan." 26
The Appellate Division held that a class action on behalf of all the
tenants could not be maintained, since the rights of the tenants would
depend upon whether their apartments were rent controlled. It re-
jected as "fallacious" a test based upon the effect a decision to purchase
would have on the occupant's way of life. The court stated that a
tenant in occupancy, contemplating purchasing his apartment, could
not stand in a better legal position than an outsider who is considering
buying into the building. Unless a tenant's right to continued occu-
pancy of his apartment is affected by the proposed conversion, he has
no right to prevent others from buying condominium units.2 7 If a
22 N.Y. Civ. PRAc. § 7801 et seq. (McKinney 1968).
23 71 Misc. 2d at 414, 386 N.Y.S.2d at 356.
24 44 App. Div. 2d 442, 855 N.Y.S.2d 592 (1st Dep't 1974), rev'g 170 N.Y.L.J. 55, Sept.
18, 1973, at 19, col. 4 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County).
25 See note 22 and accompanying text supra.
26 170 N.Y.L.J. 55, at 19, col. 5.
27 44 App. Div. 2d at 444, 355 N.Y.S.2d at 594-95.
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purchase is made based upon a deficient or misleading plan, the com-
plaining unit owner's remedy would be an action for fraud.28
In the related case of Whalen v. Parkchester Apartments,29 an
action was brought against the sponsors by plaintiffs representing four
different classes of tenants: purchasing tenants subject to rent control,
a purchasing tenant not subject to rent control, a nonpurchasing tenant
subject to rent control, and a nonpurchasing tenant not subject to rent
control. The plaintiffs sought a declaratory judgment against the
validity of the offering plan. The trial court indicated that none of the
four classes of tenants would have standing to maintain such an action.
The sponsors of the project had agreed to forego eviction of the statu-
tory tenants, except for non-payment of rent or other default. The
statutory tenants had no fear of eviction and the non-rent controlled,
nonpurchasing tenants, as in the cases relating to cooperatives, 0 had
no interest at all. Since only the ownership of the underlying fee was
being altered without affecting the possessory interests of the plaintiffs,
there was no basis for standing.31
The result of the two Whalen decisions is that nonpurchasing
tenants who are not subject to eviction will be foreclosed from bring-
ing either a special proceeding against the Attorney General or a
declaratory judgment action against the sponsor of the conversion.
Inasmuch as tenants cannot contest the validity of the plan prior to
purchase, they must either purchase under the plan or start looking
for another place to live.32 Although a defrauded purchaser could
28 Each unit owner would have to commence his own action because New York
does not recognize class actions for fraud. See note 16 and accompanying text supra.
29 170 N.Y.U.J. 55, Sept. 18, 1973, at 19, col. 6 (Sup. Ct. Bronx County).
30 See note 15 and accompanying text supra.
31 170 N.Y.L.J. 55, at 19, col. 8. See Whalen v. Lefkowitz, 44 App. Div. 2d 442, 444,
355 N.Y.S.2d 592, 594-95 (1st Dep't 1974); Ortega v. Lefkowitz, 66 Misc. 2d 438, 440, 321
N.Y.S.2d 17, 19 (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County 1971).
In Whalen v. Parkchester Apartments, although the trial court indicated that the
plaintiffs did not have standing to maintain their action, it expressly refused to dismiss
the action on that basis. Instead, it dismissed on the ground that the plaintiffs had
failed to prove that any triable issues of fact existed on the allegations of misrepresenta-
tion and misconduct.
The situation is further compounded by the fact that the New York legislature
recently enacted legislation imposing a two-year moratorium on evictions from con-
verted buildings. N.Y. Sass. LAws [1974], ch. 1021, § 2-a(1)(iii) (McKinney). Since tenants
would be under no immediate threat of eviction, they may lack standing to sue.
32In Pensic v. Sulzberger (Sup. Ct. N.Y. County), in 164 N.Y.L.J. 11, July 16, 1970,
at 2, col. 2, the court commented that:
[t]o require . . . a purchase prior to complaint as to defects in the [pilan
would pose tenants ... with a most precarious decision: truly a "Hobson's choice."
It seems clear as both a matter of the intent of the applicable legislation and of
the logic that the tenants are persons most interested in this matter and to be
protected by the requirement that a [p]lan be filed and promulgated.
1974]
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maintain an action for misrepresentation, the expenses inherent in
litigation may discourage instituting suit. Since class actions based
on deceit cannot be maintained, there is no effective group remedy.
The problem is compounded in Parkchester-type developments where
thousands of tenants could be seriously affected by a single plan.
As the New York courts have severely restricted the use of class
actions, legislation should be enacted in that state to permit tenants to
bring class actions and challenge the validity of offering plans.
Breach of Warranty
Different considerations are present when the unit owners attempt
to bring a class action against the sponsor and/or builder of the con-
dominium project for damages for defective workmanship.
In the Florida case of Gable v. Silver,33 purchasers of new con-
dominium units sued a developer over defective air conditioning,
basing their cause of action on breach of an implied warranty of mer-
chantability and fitness.34 In Edenfield v. Woodlawn Manor, Inc.,35
which arose in Tennessee, a single purchaser claimed a breach of con-
tract in that the air conditioning was not installed in the manner speci-
fied in the purchase agreement. In both cases, the plaintiffs were al-
lowed to collect the cost of correcting the defects. In an Illinois case, 36
51 purchasers of condominium units successfully sued (in a nonclass
action) a builder for breach of contract, alleging that he failed to con-
struct the project in accordance with the architect's plan.
Although these three cases did not involve representative suits,
class actions would be appropriate in such situations if there are a sub-
stantial number of aggrieved parties. It is the unit owners who sustain
damages caused by defective construction,37 and must collectively bear
33258 So. 2d II (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.), cert. dismissed, 264 So. 2d 418 (Fla. 1972) (per
curiam).
34 Cf. Mease v. Fox, 200 N.W.2d 791, 796 (Iowa 1972), where the court recognized
the existence of at least a limited implied warranty of habitability (running against latent
defects and material housing code violations) in the leasing of homes, condominiums and
apartments.
35 62 Tenn. App. 280, 462 S.W.2d 237 (Ct. App. 1970), cert. denied, 462 S.W.2d 237
(Tenn. 1971).
36Franzen v. Dunbar Builders Corp., 132 Il. App. 2d 586, 270 N.E.2d 118 (App.
Ct. 1971). All but nine of the purchase contracts specifically provided that the work
was to be done in accordance with the plan. Forty-two contracts referred to a numbered
architect's plan. Of the other nine, one was apparently misnumbered, seven gave the
name of the proposed project and not the plan number, and the blank on one contract
was not filled in. The plaintiffs were allowed to recover, although some items were not
allowed because of evidentiary errors committed at the trial; these matters were re-
manded for a new trial.
37 See Friendly Village Community Ass'n, Inc.. No. IV. v. Silva & Hill Constr. Co., 31
Cal. App. 3d 220, 107 Cal. Rptr. 123, 126 (1973).
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the cost of repairing defects through increased assessments. Additionally,
the market value of their units is reduced and their living comfort and
convenience impaired.38 When unit owners have all signed similar
contracts, and a defect is common to all units, there is a sufficient com-
mon interest to warrant maintenance of a class action.3 9 The greater
the number of units in the condominium, the more vital the need for
the class action will be.4 0
Sweetheart Contracts
Class actions could also be utilized in situations where unit owners
seek rescission of their long-term, "sweetheart" contracts with a de-
veloper.41 In states where a condominium association is not permitted
to sue on behalf of unit owners,42 it is essential that class actions be
allowed in order to prevent unscrupulous developers from building
traps for large numbers of unwary purchasers.4 3
Assessments
An area that should prove to be a tinderbox for litigation concerns
the amount of carrying charges that unit owners will be assessed for the
cost of maintaining the common elements of their building. Unless
state court jurisdiction is precluded by federal intervention,44 unit
owners should be entitled to bring class actions to contest the amounts
38 See Edenfield v. Woodlawn Manor, Inc., 62 Tenn. App. 280, 462 S.W.2d 237 (Ct.
App. 1970), cert. denied, 462 S.W.2d 237, 241-42 (Tenn. 1971). The court noted that
"consideration for comfort and convenience is one of major importance in a building
constructed as a dwelling place for the owner."
30 A class action can be maintained when there is a uniform factual situation and
only one available remedy. Cirillo v. Board of Educ., 66 Misc. 2d 749, 751, 321 N.Y.S.2d
952, 954 (Sup. Ct. Niagara County 1971). But see In re Maslinoff v. Central School Dist.
No. 1, 67 Misc. 2d 149, 323 N.Y.S.2d 1005 (Sup. Ct. Dutchess County 1971).
40 See WEINSTEIN, KoRN & MILLER, supra note 1, at 1005.11: "Permitting class
actions provides an economical means of handling disputes in large housing develop-
ments." However, in apartment house leases, class actions for breach of contract have
not been maintainable where all the leases are not identical. Jacobson v. Shore Road
Gardens, Inc., 17 App. Div. 2d 952, 953, 233 N.Y.S.2d 782, 783 (2d Dep't 1962) (mem.).
41 In Wechsler v. Goldman, 214 So. 2d 741 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968) (per curiam),
each of the unit owners signed the same 99-year lease of an adjacent recreational area
owned by the developer. The court held that the unit owners could not be relieved of
their obligations under the lease because they had 'knowledge of the lease at the time
they purchased their units and expressly accepted the lease. The condominium associa-
tions, while under control of the sponsor, also signed the lease. The court ruled that
the associations could not now attack the lease provisions. Id. at 744.
42 See notes 75-77 and accompanying text infra.
43 By allowing for greater flexibility in class action requirements, courts could pro-
vide immediate relief to purchasers damaged by unfair dealings with developers. This
would obviate the need for additional legislation. But see Wechsler v. Goldman, 214
So. 2d 741, 744 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1968).
44 See Rubel v. Linden Towers Corp. No. 6, Inc., 39 Misc. 2d 620, 241 N.Y.S.2d 779
(Sup. Ct. Queens County 1963) and text accompanying note 51 infra.
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of carrying charges set by their board of managers. Since the cost of
maintenance must be met by assessment, a reduction or increase in the
assessment of one or more units will necessarily affect the carrying
charges paid by other unit owners. In order to prevent an endless chain
of litigation, class actions should be permitted.45 That different units
may be responsible for different percentage shares of the overall assess-
ment should not preclude a class action.46
Enforcement of Bylaws
Another area susceptible to class actions by unit owners concerns
the bylaws of the condominium association. In the New York case of
Alpern v. Goldsmith,47 the Supreme Court, Nassau County, permitted
a class action to compel a board of managers to enforce bylaws. The
reasoning which permitted this action may be extended to allow unit
owners to challenge rules and regulations enacted by the board of
managers. Inasmuch as all the unit owners must comply with the by-
laws, there is a sufficient common interest to allow the maintenance of
class actions challenging their validity.
FEDERAL CLASS ACTIONS
The National Housing Act authorizes the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development (HUD) to insure blanket mortgages on con-
dominiums. 48 The Secretary is required to regulate or restrict "rents,
charges, capital structure, rate of return, and methods of operation"
of projects with mortgages that are insured.49 Federal Housing Admin-
istration (FHA) regulations issued pursuant to the statute require that,
"the mortgagor shall not permit occupancy except in accordance with
a schedule of charges and under an occupancy agreement or lease ap-
proved by the Commissioner." 50
45 Two states have enacted statutes authorizing the governing body of the condo-
minium to appeal tax assessments on behalf of all the unit owners. CONN. GEN. STAT.
§ 47-89 (1973); 30 ILL. STAT. ANN. § 312 (Supp. 1973).
46 See WEINSTEIN, KORN & MILLER, supra note 1, at 1005.12 ("that each member of
the class might be entitled to different sums is, in itself, no basis for denying the class
action").
47 166 N.Y.L.J. 86, Nov. 4, 1971, at 18, col. 5 (Sup. Ct. Nassau County).
48 12 U.S.C. § 1715y (1970).
49 Id. § 1715y(d)(2).
5024 C.F.R. § 213.29 (1973).
In 1965, the FHA was absorbed by the newly-created Department of Health, Educa-
tion, and Welfare. Department of Housing. and Urban Development Act, Pub. L. No.
89-174, § 5(a), 79 Stat. 667 (1965). Two years later, the National Housing Act was
amended in order to reflect the transfer of FHA functions to HUD. Act of May 25, 1967,
Pub. L. No. 90-19, § 1, 81 Stat. 17 amending scattered sections of 12, 42 U.S.C.
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In Rubel v. Linden Towers Coop. No. 6, Inc.,51 the New York
Supreme Court, Queens County, held that state courts do not have
jurisdiction to review a schedule of carrying charges which the FHA
has approved. Since state court consideration is precluded, the unit
owners will not be able to challenge oppressive carrying charges unless
the federal courts take cognizance of their action.
Section 10(a) of the Administrative Procedure Act (APA) provides
that "[a] person suffering legal wrong because of agency action, or ad-
versely affected or aggrieved by agency action within the meaning of a
relevant statute is entitled to judicial review thereof."52 In addition,
the National Housing Act itself authorizes the Secretary of Housing
and Urban Development to sue or be sued in any court of competent
jurisdiction, state or federal.53
In Choy v. Farragut Gardens 1, Inc.,54 a federal district court dis-
missed a class action brought on behalf of tenants of five apartment
houses.55 The plaintiffs contended that FHA-approved rents were ex-
cessive. The court noted that the FHA action was specifically com-
mitted by statute to the agency's discretion,6 and that the section of the
National Housing Act involved was specifically excluded from the
APA.5 7 The court ruled that the statute authorizing the Secretary of
Housing and Urban Development to sue or be sued constituted only a
waiver of sovereign immunity and could not serve as an independent
predicate for jurisdiction.58
51 39 Misc. 2d 620, 241 N.Y.S.2d 779 (Sup. Ct. Queens County 1963). The court
ruled that it lacked jurisdiction because any grant of relief to the plaintiffs would
necessarily involve revising FHA-approved charges. Since the FHA was acting under
authority delegated to it by Congress, a revision ordered by a state court would con-
stitute an improper assertion of state control over a federal agency. Id. at 626, 241 N.Y.S.2d
at 785, citing Fieger v. Glen Oaks Village, 309 N.Y. 527, 132 N.E.2d 492 (1956).
In Rubel, the litigation arose because the board of managers of a cooperative cor-
poration, which owned two buildings, reduced the carrying charges on apartments in the
building in which they lived while maintaining a higher level of charges for tenants in
the other one.
525 U.S.C. § 702 (1970).
53 12 U.S.C. § 1702 (1970).
54 131 F. Supp. 609 (S.D.N.Y. 1955).
55 Accord, Gant v. Cole, 166 F. Supp. 129 (S.D.N.Y. 1958), aff'd, 263 F.2d 244 (2d Cir),
cert. denied, 359 U.S. 978 (1959); James River Apartments v. Federal Housing Adminis-
tration, 136 F. Supp. 24, 29 (D. Md. 1955).
56 12 U.S.C. § 1743(b)(1) (1970). The mortgage insurance was issued under the Na-
tional War Housing Insurance section of the National Housing Act. Condominium
mortgage insurance comes under a different subchapter, and does not specifically commit
regulation of charges to FHA discretion. See id. § 1715y(d)(2).
5 Section 1743 is beyond the reach of the APA, but section 1715y, the condominium
section, is not. See 5 U.S.C. § 701 (1970).
58 131 F. Supp. at 613.
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However, in decisions handed down subsequent to Choy, the
Supreme Court ruled that section 10 of the APA authorizes court
review of federal agency action where plaintiffs allege
that the challenged action ha[s] caused them 'injury in fact,' and
where the alleged injury [is] to an interest 'arguably within the
zone of interests to be protected or regulated' by the statutes that
the agencies [are] claimed to have violated. 59
In attempting to satisfy this test, condominium unit owners will be
benefitted by the Court's presumption in favor of reviewability.60 The
"injury in fact" test can be easily satisfied by the unit owners. A unit
owner has a direct economic interest in both the amount of carrying
charges he must pay and in insuring that the condominium has suffi-
cient funds to meet its obligations. 61 Additionally, in an action under
the APA, the unit owner will not be faced with the problem of satisfy-
ing a jurisdictional amount.62
More difficulty is presented by the "zone of interest" test.63 In
Northwest Residents Association v. Department of HUD,64 a federal
59 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972), quoting Association of Data Pro-
cessing Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 153 (1970); see Abbott Laboratories v.
Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 140-41 (1967); Rusk v. Cort, 369 U.S. 367, 379 (1962). But see
Zimmerman v. United States Government, 422 F.2d 326, 330 (3d Cir. 1970); Ove Gustavs-
son Constr. Co. v. Floete, 278 F.2d 912, 914 (2d Cir. 1960); Kansas City Power & Light
Co. v. McKay, 225 F.2d 924, 932-33 (D.C. Cir.), cert. denied, 350 U.S. 884 (1955); Nuclear
Data, Inc. v. Atomic Energy Comm'n, 344 F. Supp. 719 (N.D. Ill. 1972).
The Supreme Court has yet to resolve the question of whether the APA creates an
independent basis for jurisdiction. Rusk v. Cort is authority for the proposition that it
does. H. HART & H. WECHSLER, FEDERAL COURTS AND THE FEDERAL SYs'rEM 1161 (2d ed.
1973).
6OSee, e.g., Citizens to Preserve Overton Park v. Volpe, 401 U.S. 402, 410 (1971);
Association of Data Processing Organizations, Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 157 (1970);
Barlow v. Collins, 397 U.S. 159, 166-67 (1970); Abbott Laboratories v. Gardner, 387 U.S.
136, 140-41 (1967); Peoples v. United States Dep't of Agriculture, 427 F.2d 561, 564 (D.C.
Cir. 1970), modified on rehearing, 427 F.2d 566 (per curiam); Citizens Comm. v. Volpe,
425 F.2d 97, 101-02 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 400 U.S. 949 (1970).
61 "Palpable economic injury" will serve as the basis for standing to sue under
the APA, absent a specific statutory provision for judicial review. Sierra Club v. Morton,
405 U.S. 727, 733 (1972).
62 Since the Supreme Court has at least impliedly accepted the APA as providing an
independent jurisdictional predicate, unit owners challenging HUD action do not have
to rely on either federal question jurisdiction or diversity jurisdiction in order to get
their claim before a federal court. See note 59 and accompanying text supra; 28 U.S.C.
§ 1331 (1970) (federal question jurisdiction); 28 U.S.C. § 1332 (1970) (diversity jurisdic-
tion). Both sections 1331 and 1332 have a $10,000 jurisdictional requirement.
If the unit owners seek to enforce a legal right via a diversity class action, they face
severe problems in meeting the $10,000 requirement. Zahn v. International Paper Co., 414
U.S. 291 (1973), and Snyder v. Harris, 394 U.S. 332 (1969), require that each member of a
class independently satisfy the monetary requirement, and aggregation of claims is not
permitted.





district court held that the APA, by itself, can confer jurisdiction on
the court to review HUD action.65 The court held that a zone of
interest was created by congressional affirmation of a national goal to
provide a decent home and living environment to all Americans. 6 It
should be noted that a "zone of interest" was "arguably" created by
the statute authorizing the Secretary of HUD to regulate carrying
charges. There is some indication in the legislative history of the statute
that one of its purposes was to afford some protection to unit owners.67
Once over the standing barrier, potential group representatives
are faced with the requirements of the federal class action rule. In
order to maintain a class action in federal court, the class must be so
numerous that joinder is impossible, there must be common questions
of fact and/or law, the claims of the representatives must be typical
of those of the class, and the representative must adequately represent
the class.68 In addition, one of the following conditions must be
present: 1) a risk of inconsistent adjudications, 2) a risk that individual
adjudications would impair the ability of absent class members to
obtain relief, 3) action or inaction by the adverse party on grounds
generally applicable to the class, or 4) the court finds that the common
issues predominate over the issues affecting individuals and the class
action device is superior to other methods for achieving a fair and
efficient adjudication of the dispute. 69
Unit owners in moderate or large condominium projects would
not have any great difficulty with these requirements. Unit owners in
small condominiums may have trouble demonstrating that the class is
so large as to make joinder impracticable.7 0 The requirement that the
65 See also Citizens Comm. v. Volpe, 425 F.2d 97, 102 (2d Cir.) cert. denied, 400 U.S.
949 (1970); Davis v. Humphrey, 355 F. Supp. 29, 41 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
In Northwest Residents Ass'n, plaintiffs were six property owners and a nonprofit
organization which represented them and "several hundred other home owners" in a sec-
tion of Milwaukee. They contended that HUD was improperly approving payment of
mortgage interest subsidies.
66 325 F. Supp. at 68, citing 12 U.S.C. § 1701(t) (1970); see Davis v. Romney, 355 F.
Supp. 29, 38 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
67 Under the Housing Act of 1961, which provided only for insuring individual mort-
gages and not blanket mortgages, the FHA Commissioner was authorized to regulate
charges as is "necessary and feasible to promote and protect individual owners." S. RP.
No. 281, 87th Cong., 1st Sess., in 2 U.S. CODE CONG. & AD. NEws 1923, 1938 (1961).
For purposes of the "zone of interest" test, it is not necessary that a particular class
comprise the primary beneficiaries of a particular statute. Davis v. Romney, 355 F. Supp.
29, 37 (E.D. Pa. 1973).
68 FED. R. Civ. P. 23(a) (1973).
69 Id. 23(b). Rule 23 also imposes exacting notice requirements which must be sat-
isfied. Id. 23(c), (d).
70 This "numbers" problem encountered in Federal class suits may not be as trouble-
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class be numerous is flexible and a great deal of discretion is given to
the trial court.71 Although the number of individuals in the class is not
in itself dispositive, it is a factor which must be considered.72 Professor
Charles Allen Wright reports that, while no strict numerical test is
possible, groups of 39 or less have been deemed too small, while larger
groups have been held sufficient. 73
ACTIONS BY THE ASSOCIATION
The class action is not the only device by which condominium
unit owners may attempt to assert their rights in a collective manner.
An organization representing the unit owners, such as the board of
managers or condominium association, may try to bring an action to
enforce common rights, rather than have its members do so. The
standing of the organization to maintain such actions will vary depend-
ing upon the statutes and rules of the particular jurisdiction. For in-
stance, both New York and Connecticut provide by statute that the
board of managers has standing to prosecute an action relating to the
common elements or to more than one unit.74
In Florida and California, on the other hand, a condominium
association does not have standing to maintain an action on behalf of
its members. In a California case,75 the foundation of a condominium
cracked as the result of heavy rains and unstable soil conditions. The
condominium association sued the builder for the cost of repairing the
damage, alleging that the builder improperly cut, filled and compacted
the soil. Although the association had a duty to make repairs, it was
denied standing on the ground that the association could, by assess-
ment, pass the cost through to the unit owners, the real parties in
interest.76
some in states which permit class suits based on a common interest as well as suits in
which the parties are too numerous. See note II and accompanying text supra.
71 Cypress v. Newport News Gen. & Nonsectarian Hosp. Ass'n, 375 F.2d 648, 653
(4th Cir. 1967) (en banc); Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334 F. Supp. 774, 781 (E.D. Mich.),
aff'd, 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972); Cortright
v. Resor, 325 F. Supp. 797, 807 (E.D.N.Y.), rev'd on other grounds, 447 F.2d 245 (2d Cir.
1971), cert. denied, 405 U.S. 965 (1972).
The plaintiff's allegations as to the size of his class must consist of more than specu-
lation. DeMarco v. Edens, 390 F.2d 836, 845 (2d Cir. 1968); Sims v. Parke Davis & Co., 334
F. Supp. 774, 781 (E.D. Mich.), aff'd, 453 F.2d 1259 (6th Cir. 1971) (per curiam), cert.
denied, 405 U.S. 978 (1972).
72 Fidelis Corp. v. Litton Indus., Inc., 293 F. Supp. 164, 170 (S.D.N.Y. 1968).
73 Wright, Class Actions, 47 F.R.D. 169, 172 (1969).
74 See N.Y. REAL PROP. LAW § 339-dd (McKinney 1973); VIII CONN. GEN. STAT. REV.
§ 47-85 (1973).
75 Friendly Village Community Ass'n, Inc., No. IV v. Silva & Hill Constr. Co., 31 Cal.
App. 3d 220, 107 Cal. Rptr. 123 (Ct. App. 1973).
76 Id. at 225, 107 Cal. Rptr. at 126. Since all the unit owners have a common interest
in repairing the damaged foundation, a class action should be maintainable against the
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In Florida, a condominium association, which also had a leasehold
interest in one of the units, brought an action on behalf of all of the
unit owners to clear title to an adjacent swimming pool. 7 It was al-
leged that the unit owners purchased their units in reliance on the
developer's misrepresentation that the pool was on the condominium's
property. The court held that the leasehold interest did not give the
condominium associatibn an interest co-extensive with that of the unit
owners, and noted that the Florida condominium statute did not
authorize the association to maintain a class action. 8
Federal courts have held that if members of an organization have
been injured, the organization may represent them in a judicial pro-
ceeding. 9 Thus, should HUD disapprove the carrying charges set by
the board of managers, the board could bring an action in federal
court to review the HUD decision. 0
The use of the associational form of action may serve as a valuable
alternative to litigants in jurisdictions which severely limit the bring-
ing of class actions. In states which both restrict class actions and
question the capacity of the board of managers or condominium
association to sue on behalf of the unit owners, legislation authorizing
the representatives of the condominium to institute litigation should
be made a part of the local condominium statute. A statute patterned
after New York's would be an important step toward assuring that unit
owners have access to the courts for the purpose of enforcing their
common rights.
CONCLUSION
The purchaser of a condominium unit has not only obtained a
place to live, but has joined a community whose members are de-
pendent upon each other. Wrongs committed against the community
will affect each unit owner. The unit owners should be permitted to
builder. See note 11 and accompanying text supra. The fact that each unit owner might
be entitled to recover a different amount of damages, because of variations in the assess-
ments levied on different units, should not preclude a class action. See note 46 supra. In
fact, a class action would obviate the need for many suits against the builder for small
sums based on a single set of facts.
77 Hendler v. Rogers House Condominium, Inc., 234 So. 2d 128 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App.
1970).
78234 So. 2d at 130. The condominium association alleged that its declaration gave
the association the right to bring an action on behalf of the unit owners. The court
rejected this contention on the ground that the declaration was not introduced into evi-
dence. Thus, in Florida, the possibility remains that a court might uphold a declaration
which gives the association the right to sue in the name of the unit owners.
79 Sierra Club v. Morton, 405 U.S. 727, 739 (1972); Association of Data Processing
Organizations v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150 (1970).
80 See note 64 and accompanying text supra. The board could argue that a failure
to increase the amounts of carrying charges has injured the unit owners because, without
the additional money, the board is unable to undertake necessary maintenance work.
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seek judicial redress of their grievances by means of a class action. If
unit owners are compelled to bring a series of individual actions, the
door is open to a multiplicity of suits involving the same factual and
legal issues, and cost to the state and to the litigants will be unneces-
sarily increased. Moreover, if relief may be obtained only on a case-by-
case basis, the likelihood is that all unit owners will not sue (the antici-
pated expenses being greater than the anticipated recovery) and a
wrongdoer may thus escape liability for his actions.
Fortunately, condominium class actions can be brought in most
instances since such suits relate to a "common interest." New York
courts, however, have foreclosed the use of class actions in three areas:
1) suits seeking damages for fraud and misrepresentation, 2) suits by
present nonpurchasing tenants of a building slated for conversion into
a condominium against the sponsor of the conversion, and 3) actions
against the state Attorney General for accepting an improper plan for
filing.
An essential element in a fraud action recovery is whether reliance
was placed upon the misrepresentation. Since the reliance factor has
inherently individual characteristics, denial of class relief in most in-
stances is appropriate. However, in large projects, it is possible that the
same fraudulent statements were relied upon in the same manner by a
large number of persons. The refusal to permit a class action in this
situation may prevent full vindication of the victims' rights.
The refusal to permit present tenants to challenge a conversion
plan is also unfortunate. It compels these tenants to make a difficult
decision. If a tenant elects to buy based on an allegedly defective plan,
he may be permitting himself to be a victim of fraud. If the tenant
decides not to purchase his apartment, he runs the risk of being evicted.
Legislation should be adopted to remedy this situation.
Since the condominium is a recent phenomenon, the full spectrum
of possible controversies has .not yet been experienced. 81 As diverse
forms of litigation arise, receptivity toward class actions should in-
crease. Moreover, as draftsmen of bylaws become more imaginative and
state legislators more responsive, the courts may come to accept even
greater and more divergent class actions pertaining to condominiums.
Alan D. Scheinkman
81 Among the developments forthcoming in the condominium area is the combining
of the condominium associations into a condominium union which would pursue com-
mon objectives in the legislature and conceivably in the courts. See Connolly, More
Owners of Condominiums in the Suburbs Organize, N.Y. Times, March 17, 1974, § 8
(Real Estate) at 1.
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